Introduction
There has been widespread agreement about the scale of the cybercrime problem -that it represents one of the most serious of all contemporary criminal threats (Cabinet Office, 2011 Cowley, 2012 . From the mid 1990s onwards this conclusion has driven significant shifts in legislation, policing powers and policy across most national jurisdictions. But how effective have these been? Perhaps more significantly, do these responses offer any kind of template for dealing with future developments in the cybercrime threat? In this chapter I will review the health of our defences against online offending in the light of what may be its latest mutation -an emerging complex of technical opportunity which, for convenience, will be termed 'Cybercrime 4.0'. I will ask if 'what worked' in previous contexts is likely to continue to work, or if this latest shift represents another permutation of the old maxim that 'crime control is always one step behind the (cyber) criminal'.
Cybercrime 1.0 -3.0
The usual rationale for distinguishing cybercrime from 'traditional' criminal offences centres upon the role played by technology (specifically information technology) in furthering it (though for an alternative view see my 2007). Either traditional crime is 'enhanced' in some way by technology or technology serves to shape altogether new forms of criminality. This rationale implies an obvious framework for evaluating where we have come from, where we are and how successful our efforts have been against cybercrime. This is to periodise its development in terms of certain technological shifts and to then test the relative success of responses against these shifts. Whilst there are clearly different ways in which such a periodisation might be conceptualised one very minimal, but plausible approach would be to identify 3 foundational moments in this process of change.
What we might call 'Cybercrime 1.0' would extend from the origins of modern computing in the 1940s, right through to the late 1980s'. At worst this phase offered little more than a kind of 'beta' version of cybercriminality. For though there was speculation about what 'computer crime' might entail (Parker 1976 , Becquai 1987 actual instances were minimal. In his seminal text Crime by Computer, Donn Parker argued that, by 1976, there had been just 374 computer related offences, with many of these simply involving the theft of a computer. The reason for such a low frequency of offending is obvious enough. At the time Parker was writing there were no more than around 150,000 computers in existence (1976, p.15) , most of these were large corporate or government owned 'mainframe' devices and none were connected together in any very useful way. Under these conditions, whatever the speculation, there were few practical possibilities for enacting anything like what we now think of as computer crime. Towards the end of the 1.0 era (around the mid 1980s) when the advent of 'desktop' or PC versions of computing devices began to expand the user base, opportunities for criminal exploitation also began to expand. But the isolation of these devices from each other remained a major obstacle. The limited connections that were available -largely through copying of disks or programs, created some precedents for future misuse 1 , but cybercrime 1.0 was little more than a prelude what was to follow.
Cybercrime 2.0 had a far shorter lifespan than 1.0 -arguably extending only from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. The technical shifts which distinguished this phase include the mass proliferation of personal computing devices and (of course) their global networking into the internet via the development of the HyperText, URI and HTTP system better known as the 'world wide web'. In a sense cybercrime 2.0 remains the basic template for all cybercriminality, for it suffices to provide for its key requirements -a network of social relations where most of the crimes familiar within everyday life -theft, sexual misconduct, anti-social behaviour and more can be perpetrated. Two things lent cybercrime 2.0 its sense of novelty: first, that crimes could be committed 'at a distance' and second the unique criminal possibilities created by ICT itself -the so called 'pure' or cyberdependent crimes such as malware creation and distribution. Though it caught many off guard, the explosive growth associated with 2.0 ought not to have been any more surprising than previous surges in offending driven by new technologies. For example, the huge rises in intellectual property theft which followed the advent of the printing press (McGuire, 2007) .
If technological change offers a suitable framework for evaluating changes to the cybercrime threat then shifts in the mid 2000's offer good grounds for identifying a further transition -into 'Cybercrime 3.0'. Like 2.0 this reconfiguration rested upon a further acceleration in the scope of connectivity -this time provided by the advent of mobile computing.
Just how quickly this shift occurred can be seen in the fact that, by 2006 around 93% of UK households had acquired a mobile connection -for the first time exceeding households with a fixed connection (90%) (Ofcom, 2007) . In the same year, 3G connections grew by over 70% resulting in 7.8 million subscribers. Only 5 years later, 4G had become the 'new normal' for connectivity with active subscriptions in the UK alone rising from 318,000 in 1 Computer viruses offer one example. Piracy and illicit copying provide another kind of precedent.
early 2013 to over 6 million by 2014 (Ofcom 2015) And just as smartphone take-up in the UK expanded from 51% to around 61% between 2013-14, 'traditional' desktop PC ownership continued to decline rapidly (down from 44% in 2012 to 35% in 2014), (Ofcom 2014) . When considered at the global level, these trends are even more pronounced. There were one billion unique mobile subscribers across the globe in 2003 (just under one in six people) but within 10 years this had more than trebled to over 3.4 billion (GSMA 2014) . The majority of the world's population (56%) are likely to have their own mobile subscription by 2020, (ibid). This exponential leap in global connectivity brought enough new and distinctive vulnerabilities to suggest that a qualitatively (and quantitatively) new criminal landscape had indeed emerged. As early as 2004 the world's first mobile malware was detected -the 'Cabir' internet worm which targeted the Nokia Series 60 (Schmidt et al 2009 , Fortinet 2013 . Though this had a relatively innocuous outcome (the word "Caribe" appearing on the screen of infected phones), mobile malware had become a far more serious problem by 2014, affecting over 16 million phones (Spencer, 2015) . In the same year, over 38 percent of smartphone users were reporting being a victim of cybercrime, typically via phishing and spam attacks (Norton 2013). As with Cybercrime 2.0 a key problem here has been user awareness and a failure to appreciate the nature of the shift underway.
Even now, under 50% of wireless users do not have passwords or personal identification numbers (PINs) on their handsets (CTIA 2013) . Still fewer use any security software when using their smartphones to access online banking details (ibid).
Cybercrime 4.0?
In the 1950s, when Moores Law of computing development was first formulated 2 , no-one imagined that computer crime might follow a similar pattern of sustained acceleration (cf of the key challenges that remain which is required, but also sober reflection upon previous successes. For in spite of all the pessimism there is a reasonable case to be made that concerted action has resulted in significant progress in curbing cybercrime.
How to measure this is of course a difficult question since an obvious metriccomparisons between arrests/prosecutions and material reductions in cybercrime -is made difficult by the lack of robust, cybercrime-specific data across most jurisdictions. In-sofar as any answers can be given, evaluating success has usually come down to using one or more of the following measures.
- The second pattern of technical response has centred upon dealing and detecting with a problem once it has reached the computer (e.g. antivirus protection, techniques for collecting digital evidence etc.). Though antivirus protection has been the most commonly used of these its effectiveness has been increasingly questioned. Claims that antivirus is 'dead' (Krebs 2014) have been supported by recent experiments indicating that only about 5% of viruses are taken down by existing AV (Perlroth 2012 has not yet been properly tested for its crime-control impacts.
What then of more orthodox, human based forms of response, such as those offered by our traditional criminal justice system? In policing terms, the development of specialised cyber provision aimed at enhancing the skills required for more effective detection, apprehension and prosecution of cyber-criminals has been a very common response, with around 90% of countries who responded to a recent UN survey (UNODC 2013) stating that they had -or were going to put into place specialised structures for cyberpolicing.
More than 75% said that existing law enforcement now have a cyber-focused unit, and around 15% reported specialised agencies (ibid). However, disparities in resourcing within less developed nations means that this figure is less reassuring than it sounds -especially given the obvious attractions of cybercrime within such jurisdictions.
A recurring problem for specialised cyberpolicing provision has been a lack of stability and continuity. In the UK for example the extensive expertise that had been built up by the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) was effectively lost when its functions were replaced by the new Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). In turn, SOCA has now been absorbed into the new National Crime Agency (NCA) which has also incorporated other specialised cyber-policing agencies such as CEOP, one of the pioneers of online child protection. It has also taken over responsibility for countering cyber-fraud from the now defunct National Fraud Authority. Overly centralised agencies like these raise questions about the level of responsibility placed in one body, though too many units One more complex metric for assessing the effectiveness of legal (and policing) responses has been to look at 'suspect to offence ratios' for particular cyberoffences (i.e. the number of individuals 'brought into contact with law enforcement' in relation to the offences) and to then compare these to ratios for more standard offences. This metric confirms suspicions that ratios for typical cybercrime offences like hacking or computer fraud remain far lower than conventional crime (c40 suspects for every 100 offences, compared to from Germany to the USA on suspicion of ATM frauds (Strohm, 2015) . However, extradition tends to be a very one way affair (almost invariably to the USA) -and only happens where there are existing extradition agreements.
A second problem relates to the possibility of over-legislation, since too much law can clearly create cyber-criminality where none previously existed. Worse, it can undermine public trust by criminalising too widely. This concern is reflected in a third problemthe disproportionate use of law against cybercriminals. At a time when those responsible for the large scale financial frauds which pushed the world economy into recession remained almost entirely unpunished, cyber -offenders have faced draconian sanctions.
Thus, Aaron Swartz (a hacktivist who used illegal methods to force universities to make their research more freely accessible) was threatened with a 30 year sentence (he subsequently committed suicide), whilst Ross Ulbricht, who created the Silk road online market was handed a life sentence, even though website hosts (eg an online newspaper forum)
are not generally held accountable for illegal actions which occur as a result. These and many other examples force us to ask whether this legal excess actually helps reduce cybercrime or merely augments the feeding frenzy around it. . Though this can be partly attributed to the hotline having just been rolled out when the survey was conducted, two years later over half of users were still saying that they had no idea where to report cybercrime (GSO/Vision Critical 2014). More worryingly, less than a third of the public said that they reported cybercrime events at all (ibid). Over excitable reporting of cybercrime has not helped public confidence in online security and has often persuaded them that the threat is more significant than it is or -worse -that nothing can be done. One result has been to create crime -for example in the emergence of online vigilantism by individuals seeking to 'crack down' on popular hate figures like the 'online paedophile' (cf Booth 2013). The conclusion has to be that, though there have been improved provisions for public and private responses to cybercrime over the last few years have brought they have clearly not yet resulted in the feeling that we are anything like on top of the problem.
The challenge of Cybercrime 4.0?
To what extent might any of these previous successes (or indeed failures) be instructive within the as yet untested context of Cybercrime 4.0 and its refiguring of the offending landscape? Will its enhanced connectivities, its reshaping of service delivery and the increasingly intelligent interactivity available prove too testing a cocktail for existing responses? Or is our fear of the threat again likely to be disproportionate to the actuality?
Its first defining factor -enhanced network multiplication -seems, prima facie, to be It is this diversity of enhanced connectivity which will inevitably produce new risks.
Cybercriminals are already using enhanced connectivity to disable AV protection, for ex- intercept contactless payments much further away -up to 80cms (Dyson 2013) . Worse, other researchers, using easily obtainable scanners, were able to obtain personal data that was meant to be hidden on contactless debit/credit cards. They then used this data to purchase other far more valuable items -including a £3,000 TV (Batchelor, 2015) . At the more exotic end of the risk spectrum are the criminal opportunities presented by internal bodily devices. One example is the notorious 'pace-maker' hack concept which, in theory, could enable internal medical devices to be manipulated or disrupted remotely. The fact that high ranking politicians like Dick Cheney (who wore a pacemaker during his latter period in office) have been thought to be vulnerable as a result (Peterson 2013) suggests that is not just a fantasy. Europol's prediction of the first murder via "hacked internetconnected device" by the end of 2014 (cf. Europol 2014) did not come to pass, but this does not rule it out in the near future.
The second key factor within the 4.0 threat landscape centres upon shifts in the delivery of computing services, in particular the development of cloud-based provisions.
From being a resource which was predominantly user driven and owned -the traditional 'box on the desktop' -computing provision has increasingly become something remote.
And this means that it is controlled centrally by large providers who operate with the kind of service delivery model more commonly seen with utilities like gas and electricity. At first glance, no special criminal risks appear to be posed by this -indeed the opposite. For surely, it might be argued, if the responsibility for computing provision (and therefore its security) is taken away from (fallible) individuals and placed in the hands of better informed and better resourced providers, criminal threats will decrease rather than increase? Unfortunately when information rather than power is the commodity in question, utility metaphors -however useful -become somewhat strained. A first and most obvious difference relates to ownership. We do not think of water or electricity as something which is 'owned' by us, but which is rather supplied to us. By contrast, our personal data does in a sense belong to us (in spite of the best efforts of data brokers to obscure this) -for example it can be stolen. Where computing power is centralised -so too is much of the information which used to reside primarily upon personal computing devices and an inevitable result is Even though Cloud provision is at a relatively early stage, there have already been some instances of the problems it is likely to generate. Take for example AWS, the Amazon Cloud which, given Amazons extensive resources, should be one of the more secure services. But AWS has been linked to a number of cybersecurity incidents, notably the 2014 attack on the company Code Spaces, when someone acquired an entry to their control panel on AWS (Venezia, 2014) . A classic extortion attack followed which involved demands for money in return for ceding control back to Code Spaces. When Code Spaces refused to give into the demands and attempted to take control back, the hacker began to delete many of their key resources -including the backups which were accessible via the same panel (ibid). The consequences of this attack were serious for the company -it was effectively forced to cease operations -and emphasizes how easily 'insider' attacks via the cloud can be more destructive than traditional 'outside-in' hacks.
Amazon is not the only major Cloud provider which has experienced security issues. In another notorious recent attack the Apple iCloud was comprised when a series of personal celebrity photos were accessed and then posted on websites like 4chan (cf Arthur 2014). One accusation is that Apple's security around the 'Find My Iphone' service did not prevent 'brute force' 7 attacks and it was this weakness that may have been exploited for the hack (ibid). Alternatively, a cloud based Dropbox account where some of these photos were stored may have been accessed -again emphasizing the danger of internal cloud attacks. More worryingly the attack may have been human centred, with access se-cured either by obtaining passwords, an ex-employee gaining access to one account then chaining to others, or by some variation upon phishing, where a user was fooled into handing over log-in details. Either way, once inside, access rapidly multiplied through addressbooks linked to other address books. The hack provides a perfect example of how responses to 4.0 criminality will need to be sophisticated enough to incorporate more than purely technical measures.
It is not just the novel way in which Cloud architectures function which is likely to present new criminal opportunities. A second worry is the immense computing power which the cloud offers, power which can be hired easily and cheaply. In most cases this is This used only free trials and cloud accounts in combination with an automated system to generate unique email addresses which signed up for these accounts in huge numbers.
(Greenberg 2014).
A second set of options for exploiting the different patterns of service delivery which are emerging centre more on functionality and the so called 'app'. The shift from an internet serviced primarily by web-sites to one which increasingly functions in terms of applications/apps has been fairly subtle, but 'appification' has become a major trend within com- Bitcoin. This does not just impede the kind of experimentation that was possible with the early internet but turns the tools used by the large providers for creating apps into targets themselves. For example, researchers have uncovered a substantial number of vulnerabilities in the Google app maker, some of which potentially allow server privileges within the cloud to be exploited for the kinds of internal attacks discussed above (Constantin, 2014b) .
In all of this nothing has yet been said about the implications of the third ingredient of the 4.0 landscape, the proliferation of artificially intelligent agents across the web. It is not just that space precludes detailed consideration of this, but also that the implication of AI for cybercriminality remains a major unknown in terms of criminal possibility. The possibility that driverless cars could be subject to cyberattacks which hand over key functions like braking and steering to third parties has already been demonstrated (Harris 2014 , Versprille, 2015 But otherwise, whether it is more intelligent botnets, phishing frauds conducted by artificial agents, or criminal conspiracies taking guidance from Siri or other online 'companions' (Goodman 2015) , the risks posed by synthetic minds connected to the internet can only be partially evaluated at present. Of course, from Frankenstein to the Forbidden Planet, artificial agency has always stoked irrational fears within us. The key challenge will be to separate out the fears from the genuine criminal liabilities this aspect of the 4.0 landscape is likely to pose (cf, Hallevy 2010).
The predominance of technical solutions in addressed cybercrime 1 -3.0 is likely to be maintained in the response to cloud and app based criminalities -in spite of the doubts raised earlier. Criminal justice based responses will clearly also remain indispensableeven though 4.0 is likely to significantly augment the problems posed by 'traditional' cybercrime. Take as just one example the increased availability of anonymous communication channels and the ease in setting up (and closing down) anonymous accounts provided by the cloud. Not only will this make it more difficult for authorities to detect and apprehend cybercriminals, it will also make obtaining the forensic evidence needed to convict them far more challenging. The 'traditional' cybercrime problem of transjurisdictionality can therefore only get worse since many providers of cloud services also make it possible to locate their virtual machines within distinct physical locations. As a result, it will be entirely possible for a virtual machine created in say, Asia to be used to mount attacks on locations in the US or UK. One very recent example of these difficulties can be seen in the decision of the notorious file sharing website Pirate Bay to shift its operations to cloud providers around the world. The result has been that providers host the Pirate Bay, without knowing that they are doing this and the service can shift from country to country as necessary.
And this means that there has been scarcely any take down time for the site in the 2 years since it was created (BBC 2012).
Conclusions -4.0 and beyond...
The risks posed by cybercrime have nearly always been characterized as 'constantly evolving'. But evidence for our success in managing these risks is so far mixed. On the one hand it is clear that, after a slight delay in appreciating the significance of this form of crime, responses have become more comprehensive and targeted and there is now greater collaboration in managing them across most jurisdictions. And whether it is technical responses, criminal justice interventions or a more informed and engaged public, real obstacles have been put in the way of unfettered cybercriminality which should not be over-
looked. Yet just when we might have thought it was becoming safer to enter the online waters, a new game appears to be coming into town. A massively connected, increasingly intelligent network, where services are provided by third parties over whom we little control and even less knowledge. If cybercrime really is as technology dependent as we are told, these ever-shifting permutations may be something we will simply have to adjust to. But it
